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Educational research: the importance of the humanities  
 
Richard Smith 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is one sign of the lack of understanding of the value of the humanities, to educational 
research and inquiry as to our world more widely, that such justifications of them as are 
offered frequently take a crudely instrumental form. The humanities (which I do not here 
distinguish from the arts) are welcomed insofar as they are beneficial to the economy, for 
example, or play a therapeutic role in people’s physical or mental well-being.  In higher 
education in the UK, at any rate, they are marginalised similarly, on the grounds that they 
neither appeal to the lucrative overseas student market nor constitute a significant source of 
grant income from research councils, industry or other funding sources. While their place in 
educational research is still defended in many quarters, the increasing demand that research 
should have ‘impact’ can leave the humanities appearing ineffectual. Furthermore the very 
idea of research is widely taken to mandate empiricist and ‘scientific’ approaches. While 
there are no easy solutions to this state of things, those of us who value the humanities in and 
for themselves might adopt two approaches in particular: to pursue vigilant criticism of the 
rampant instrumentalism and scientism of our time, and to emphasise the importance of that 
distinctive feature of humane enquiry, interpretation.  
 
 
 
I Introduction 
Some preliminary moves will set out what I understand by ‘the humanities’. At the same time 
they will indicate some of the directions in which my argument will go. I take the humanities 
to include ‘philosophy, political science, religious studies, history, anthropology, sociology, 
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literature, art, music, and studies of language and culture’: the list is Martha Nussbaum’s.1 
She is writing of what she describes as ‘the parts of a liberal education that have by now 
become associated with “the humanities” and to some extent “the social sciences”’. The 
qualifications are helpful, both in indicating the dimensions of subject areas that are relevant 
(statistical analyses of voting patterns or suicide rates do not seem especially at home in the 
‘humanities’) and in reminding us that there is a degree of fashion and even arbitrariness in 
what the humanities are taken to include. I would want to add to Nussbaum’s list studies 
relating to film and other media; some areas of psychology such as recent critiques of the 
identification of the mind with the brain; psychoanalysis; human geography, whose 
specialists research inter alia well-being and health, including the experiences of users of the 
mental health services; and, by no means least, education as a field of enquiry in its 
philosophical, sociological and historical approaches.  
It is common, in the UK at any rate, for the terms ‘humanities’ and ‘arts’ to be used 
interchangeably. The Arts and Humanities Research Council, for example, makes no attempt 
at a distinction.
2
 It would make little difference to what I say here if I preferred the term 
‘arts’. However there is a growing tendency to use this word to indicate the performing and 
creative arts such as design, drama, film-making, dance and photography, not least because 
they have a readily understandable pay-off. In a recent newspaper article
3
 the journalist 
Simon Jenkins defends the ‘arts graduates’ of these disciplines largely on the grounds that 
they are ‘high achievers in finding work outside their skill group, probably through enhanced 
confidence and articulacy’ (these are no doubt to be thought of as transferable 
‘employability’ skills). He describes those who have studied the performing and creative arts 
as beneficiaries of a ‘humanistic education’, and regards the future as lying not ‘in the brave 
new world of cyborgs and robots’, but ‘in what are rightly called the humanities’, which he 
glosses as ‘the history and imagination of human beings’. Despite Jenkins’s nods towards an 
older conception of the arts it seems clear that his identification of them with the humanities 
is part of recasting both in what are taken to be more practical and useful terms, rather than as 
constituents of the liberal tradition that Nussbaum wants to restore.  
                                                          
1
 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) 11. 
 
2
 Arts & Humanities Research Council: http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/About-Us/Pages/About-Us.aspx. 
 
3
 Simon Jenkins, “Easy to sneer at arts graduates. But they will shape our world”, The Guardian 2 
Jan. 2015. 
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This example shows both something of what is at stake in thinking about the humanities, and 
why it is difficult to achieve any characterisation of them that would command wide 
acceptance. If they can embrace dance and photography, and areas of psychology and human 
geography, what can we say with confidence that they do not include? It might seem that we 
can draw a line between them and the sciences, but this requires caution. For instance, recent 
writers have interpreted Charles Darwin’s ideas about evolution – essentially a scientific 
theory, it might be thought – as coloured by romanticism4 and a deep interest in, and respect 
for, what might be thought of as the lowliest creatures, worms, sightless moles and flightless 
birds, a long way from the Darwin who is supposed to have championed the ‘survival of the 
fittest’.5 Darwin was keenly aware of the political and moral implications of his work, though 
in The Origin of Species he confined himself to the cautious understatement that ‘Light will 
be thrown on the origin of man and his history’.6 Scientists exploring the vastness of the 
universe (or universes, as some would now put it) are unsure whether it would be more 
extraordinary for us human beings to be alone here or for there somewhere to exist other 
creatures like us, with all the consequences of either interpretation, both practically and in 
terms of our self-image.
7
 The ‘brave new world of cyborgs and robots’ that Simon Jenkins 
(above) sets up apparently as the technical end of science in order to contrast with his vision 
of the humanities, in fact holds profound consequences for our understanding of what it is to 
be human. This has been understood at least since Descartes’ great thought-experiment which 
can here be re-worked as leading to the (erroneous) conclusion that I cannot be a robot if I am 
here wondering whether I am one: a thought-experiment that has been artistically dramatized 
in the film Blade Runner. 
To these difficulties about the idea of the humanities we can add several more, most of them 
at least touched on by other contributors to this Issue. If what is distinctive about the 
humanities is that they are supposed to explore the human condition, then a plausible 
criticism is that ‘being human’ has tended to be conceptualised from particular perspectives, 
                                                          
4
 George Levine, Darwin Loves You. Natural Selection and the Re-enchantment of the World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
5
 See Adam Phillips, Darwin’s Worms (London: Faber, 1999). 
 
6
 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: Grant Richards, 1902), Ch. 14. 
 
7
 See eg The Fermi Paradox, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wait-but-why/the-fermi-
paradox_b_5489415.html 
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primarily Eurocentric and masculine ones containing more than the seeds of colonialization 
and exploitation. This can easily be illustrated with respect to notions of personal identity and 
rationality as elements of being human, and to the relationship between humankind and the 
natural world. Yet the criticism is a positive rather than a dismissive one. It directs us not to 
imagine the humanities as revealing some timeless essence of what it is to be human – if 
anyone ever thought of them in this way – but rather as offering perspectives on or 
interpretations of the human condition. Such interpretations never claim to be final and 
authoritative: they are endlessly revisable as we encounter other people and learn of their 
experiences. I return to this point in the last section of the paper. To work and to write in the 
humanities is always to be part of a conversation joined by other voices who from time to 
time cause us to review our own standpoint in a new light. In particular, we are always 
learning of new and different ways in which people can be dehumanised, even if we are 
rightly reluctant to essentialise what it is to be human: ways in which, as Richard Rorty puts 
it,
8
 we can be cruel to each other. This is one thing that the humanities teach us.  
 
II  Instrumentalising the humanities 
Before turning to this point, however, and before discussing the place of the humanities in 
educational research and enquiry, I offer some illustrations of the wider fate of the arts and 
humanities in the UK, at the present time, which is that they are understood and justified in 
more or less crude instrumental terms. These examples show how they are rapidly becoming 
absorbed into what I have elsewhere
9
 described as an ‘epistemic monoculture’ in which the 
diversity of value – of sport, remembrance and happiness as well as of the arts and 
humanities – is required to speak its truth in the language of means-end reasoning. The 
problem is not that the humanities are being thought of as good for something else, as if the 
only proper way to value them was ‘for their own sake’, a phrase whose opacity should 
bother us more than it does. The problem is that instrumentalism, while appearing innocently 
to observe that things which are good are generally good for something other than 
themselves, quickly moves to insisting on short-term and crude pay-offs: a move that 
                                                          
8
 Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
 
9
 Richard Smith, An epistemic monoculture and the university of reasons, in: David Lewin, Alex 
Guilherme and Morgan White, eds., New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Education: Ethics, Politics 
and Religion (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 125-138. 
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precludes consideration of more complex benefits and those deeper values that the arts and 
humanities can help us understand.   
To begin with three small and local examples: the English town of Belper in Derbyshire has 
revived its Arts festival. The local newspaper headlines this as ‘Arts festival to boost 
economy’, and reports that ‘organisers are predicting it could give the town’s traders a  
massive £110,000 boost’.10 The announcement that Hull, in Yorkshire, was to be the 2017 
City of Culture was reported as a ‘£184 million boost’11. The local paper highlighted the 
creation of jobs and established the relative status of culture and the economy by putting 
economic benefits at the start of its headline: ‘£60m UK City of Culture boost for Hull is 
“start of the future”’.12 The website for the 2015 Welsh Eisteddfod includes a prominent link, 
‘Supporting the economy’, where the reader is reassured that 
Independent research commissioned three times between 2000 and 2008 has shown a 
positive impact of £6-£8 million on the local economy, when the Eisteddfod visits the 
area… Blaenau Gwent County Borough Council commissioned their own economic 
impact research during the 2010 Eisteddfod, and results showed that the festival had a 
positive impact of over £7 million on the local economy, having a particular impact 
on shops and the food and drink sectors.  
That the Eisteddfod is ‘one of the world’s greatest cultural festivals … [offering] an eclectic 
mix of music, literature, dance, theatre, visual arts and much more’ only emerges as an 
answer to one of the FAQs.  
These examples perhaps do no more than repeat elements of the bids that secured the 
successes they report, and in any case economic uplifts to deprived areas of the UK or 
anywhere else are not to be denigrated. Nevertheless, the distinctive goods represented by the 
arts can easily be forgotten when they are expressed in the same terms as the benefits to be 
obtained from the opening of a new car-plant or mega-store. More substantial examples are 
not difficult to find. A newspaper article by Peter Bazalgette, ‘Use the arts to boost the 
                                                          
10
 Belper News 27 Jan. 2015. 
 
11
 Daily Mail 20 Nov. 2013.  
 
12
 Hull Daily Mail 21 Nov. 2013.  
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nation’s health’,13 argues that the funding crisis in the UK’s National Health Service can be 
solved by using the arts as a medical resource.  
In Cornwall, the Baring Foundation and Arts Council England are funding everything 
from theatre and textiles to dance or drama in care homes. The director of arts for 
Health Cornwall, Jayne Howard, says: ‘Creative engagement for older people has 
been linked to greater mobility, greater social interaction, stronger appetite and a 
generally better quality of life’. … In Liverpool, local museums have developed 
House of Memories, an inspiring history project to help dementia sufferers capture 
and savour their past. …The Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health NHS 
Foundation Trust has partnered with the Birmingham Rep to create the Bedlam 
Festival of Ideas
14
, involving those with mental health problems in drama and 
comedy. 
These developments are called ‘social prescribing’. In some parts of the UK doctors can 
prescribe drama, music or painting to their patients. ‘University College, London has 
developed a three-year scheme actually called Museums on Prescription, which is being 
trialled in the south-east. It connects isolated, vulnerable older people to their local heritage; 
that is, to their own personal culture’. Naturally there is a similar scheme called Books on 
Prescription, through which ‘books are recommended by doctors or other health professionals 
to support patients with particular conditions’.15 Anyone surprised that health professionals 
are now equipped to understand just which conditions can be relieved by Little House on the 
Prairie but would be worsened by Paradise Lost is reassured by the hyperlinked website:
16
 
the books, which have such titles as Overcoming Chronic Fatigue, Break Free from OCD and 
The Feeling Good Handbook, are designed as part of – or instead of, it is not entirely clear – 
a cognitive behavioural programme. Similarly the benefits of Museums on Prescription seem 
to be getting out of the house and meeting people: real benefits, to be sure, particularly for 
                                                          
13
 Peter Bazalgette, “Use the arts to boost the nation’s health”, The Observer, 28 Dec. 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/28/arts-boost-nations-health-nhs-funding-arts-
council. 
 
14
 Peter Bazalgette, “Use the arts to boost the nation’s health”. 
 
15
 Peter Bazalgette, “Use the arts to boost the nation’s health”. 
 
16
 http://www.booksonprescription.org.uk/ 
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vulnerable people, but it is not obvious that museums, as opposed to other kinds of venues, 
are essential for this, still less that one museum would be better than another. When all 
museums are thought of indifferently as the same, something important about their place in 
the arts has been lost. 
Bazalgette’s article includes, we should not be surprised to find, some remarks in line with 
the prevailing orthodoxy about the importance of establishing ‘what works’ and ‘rigorous 
evidence testing’. This does not stop him suggesting, on the basis of what appears to be no 
evidence at all, that ‘projects already underway’ have saved the National Health Service more 
than half a billion pounds. He finishes with the chilling observation that ‘There’s also much 
work to be done helping arts organisations and health authorities speak the same language’: 
chilling, because it could only be an instrumentalised language of the arts. 
Another substantial example: in 2014 Amsterdam’s Rijksmuseum hosted an exhibition called 
‘Art is Therapy’. Here John Armstrong and Alain de Botton show ‘what art can mean to 
visitors. And not so much from an (art-)historical point of view, but focusing rather on the 
therapeutic effect that art can have and the big questions in life that art can answer’.17 They 
offer a commentary on 150 artworks in the museum, ‘from the Middle Ages right through to 
the 20
th
 century, including the Asia Pavilion’.18 Armstrong and de Botton are experts in an   
extraordinary range of art, it appears: most art historians specialise in a limited period or 
school, such as the Renaissance or Cubism. But such scepticism would be misplaced: the 
purpose of the exhibition is ‘to throw the emphasis not on where art came from or who made 
it, but what it can do for you – the ordinary visitor with the concerns that trouble us all’. 
Accordingly the usual wall labels, which often give little more than the name of the artist and 
the date of the painting, are variously replaced or upstaged by enormous yellow Post-it notes 
which, often being larger than the exhibits, seem to make the greater claim on the viewer’s 
attention.  
A piece of video on the web in which de Botton interprets the ‘show’ for the viewer gives a 
sense of the kind of therapeutic value de Botton sees in particular art works.
19
 Rembrandt’s 
                                                          
17
 John Armstrong and Alain de Botton, “Art is Therapy”. https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/art-is-
therapy. 
 
18
 John Armstrong and Alain de Botton, “Art is Therapy”.  
 
19
 http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/video/2014/apr/25/alain-de-botton-art-is-therapy-
rijksmuseum-amsterdam-video-guide 
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vast painting, The Night Watch, occupies one wall of a room that is usually full of visitors. De 
Botton tells us that we would like to be part of a crowd such as the painting depicts – a band 
of brothers, people with a common purpose – but not the crowd around us in the room where 
the painting is displayed. The Post-it tells us that ‘this picture is about loneliness, for it tells 
us what we are missing when we are lonely’. It ends with the line ‘I can’t bear busy places – I 
wish this room were emptier’. An intricate wooden linen-cupboard reminds us that putting 
the linen in order ‘belongs to the dignified aspects of life’ and is not just some ‘horrible, 
boring chore’. This, de Botton says, is its message to us. A painting of a tumultuous naval 
battle ‘is frank about pride in achievement’, according to its accompanying Post-it, and stands 
as a reproof to our tamer and less spirited world where we often lack ‘the sheer courage and 
force of character’ to see things through. The message is that ‘Goodness should be strong’.  
Here is a pastiche of what might be thought of as the traditional role of the arts in 
illuminating the lives of ordinary people struggling to understand the human condition. The 
problem is not simply the banality and shallowness of the commentary, which some 
reviewers of the exhibition have noted.
20
 It is partly the way that de Botton knows everything 
there is to say about the painting or the cupboard in advance, as it were, before and without 
any real engagement with it, without the effort of interpretation. There is no effort. The 
exhibits do not hold before us more than we ever fully know: they merely confirm what on 
the most superficial level we know already. And it is partly that any picture of a crowd with a 
common purpose would presumably do as well as The Night Watch, any painting of a violent 
sea-battle would send us the same message as van Wieringen’s.21 The instrumentalism of art 
again has the effect that we barely need to look at particular paintings and art-objects at all: 
we read the message, nod in agreement and move on.  
Instrumentalism has naturally made itself at home in the university too. One story, told by 
Marina Warner, novelist, historian and theorist of feminism and the fairy-story, can stand for 
many. In 2005 she was appointed to a Chair at the University of Essex, a university, founded 
in 1964, with a reputation for cosmopolitanism and for radical innovation in both the manner 
and breadth of its teaching. The Caribbean poet Derek Walcott accepted an invitation to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
20
 Eg Adrian Searle in The Guardian, 25 April 2014.  
 
21
 The full title of the painting is The Explosion of the Spanish Flagship During the Battle of 
Gibraltar, 25 April 1607.  
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become professor of poetry there in 2009. In 2012 Warner was asked to chair the Man 
Booker International Prize
2223
 for 2015, and to give a series of seminars at All Souls College, 
Oxford. These accolades were well received and supported from ‘on high’, as Warner puts it, 
at Essex. However this was while research was regarded as of major importance at this and 
almost every UK university. Things quickly changed when a new Vice-Chancellor arrived 
and made it known that he was less impressed by high research ratings than the fact that in 
future they will be less well funded. Warner writes that ‘Suddenly, the watchword from 
management was “Teaching, Teaching, Teaching”’. Her agreement that she would divide her 
time 70 per cent for research and 30 per cent for teaching was rescinded. If she wanted to 
honour her commitments to the Man Booker and All Souls College she would have to take a 
year’s unpaid leave. A proposed new human rights building on the campus became a big new 
business school instead. Derek Walcott’s visiting professorship was terminated, at the 
personal insistence of the Vice-chancellor and against the express wishes of everybody else. 
Warner writes:  
Outside grants are becoming the only way to earn time off to write or to take on a 
piece of research. The model for higher education mimics supermarkets’ competition 
on the high street; the need for external funding pits one institution against another – 
and even one colleague against another, and young scholars waste their best energies 
writing grant proposals… I could go on, about the cases of colleagues and their 
experience of managers’ ‘instructions’, arrogance and ignorance, and the devices they 
adopt to impose their will … What is happening at Essex reflects … the general 
distortions required to turn a university into a for-profit business – one advantageous 
to administrators and punitive to teachers and scholars. 
This, the government’s business model for higher education, she writes, is wholly 
incompatible with the university’s traditional mission which, as she puts it, is to 
inspire the citizenry, open their eyes and ears, achieve international standing, fill the 
intellectual granary of the country and replenish it, attract students from this country 
                                                          
22
 Marina Warner, “Why I quit”, London Review of Books 11 Sept. 2014. That her experience is now 
widespread is confirmed by many of the comments on the online version of her article: 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n17/marina-warner/diary 
 
23
 A biennial international literary award made to a living author of any nationality for a body 
of work published in English or generally available in English translation. 
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and beyond, keep up the reputation of the universities, expect your educators and 
scholars to be public citizens and serve on all kinds of bodies… 
Marina Warner’s apocalyptic vision and language are now echoed by many. For instance, the 
distinguished literary theorist and cultural critic Terry Eagleton wrote at the beginning of 
2015 that ‘we’re living through an absolutely historic moment – namely the effective end of 
universities as centres of humane critique, an almost complete capitulation to the philistine 
and sometimes barbaric values of neo-capitalism’.24  Marina Warner herself, writing again in 
2015,
25
 and now the holder of a Chair at Birkbeck College, University of London, and winner 
of the 2015 Holberg prize following her departure from the University of Essex,
26
 remarked 
bleakly that ‘Faith in the value of a humanist education is beginning to look like an antique 
romance’. An Easter editorial in The Guardian27 referred to the UK Conservative-led 
Coalition government’s ‘assaults on the teaching of humanities’ alongside its assaults on 
social security and migrants as being all ‘underpinned by a belief that the essential metric of 
human worth is their utility … [where] it is the marketplace that provides the only final 
judgement’. When the ‘extraordinary idea that people have worth in themselves’ (ibid.) 
comes to seem quaint, the idea of the humanities as having anything other than extrinsic 
value, in boosting tourism or helping people to overcome chronic fatigue, naturally suffers 
the same fate.  
 
IV Educational research 
Given most of what I have written in this paper so far there might seem little reason to expect 
educational research and enquiry to take much interest in the topics and areas with which the 
humanities have traditionally concerned themselves, or to draw on the literature of the 
humanities and the ideas and insights that they explore, or to use their characteristic 
approaches and disciplines: philosophy, history or theology, for example. In fact although 
                                                          
24
 Interview with Terry Eagleton, Times Higher Education, 8 Jan. 2015, 43.  
 
25
 Marina Warner, “Learning my Lesson”, London Review of Books, 19 March 2015. 
 
26
 An international award, sometimes called ‘the Nobel Prize of the Arts’, worth roughly £400k. 
 
27
 3 April, 38. 
 
 11 
 
there are, as we shall see, many pressures driving educational research (as it will then be 
called) towards empiricism, the scientific and the faux-scientific, a very broad view of it, 
which might equally be called educational enquiry as educational research, is built into its 
institutionalisation in the UK.
28
 This is effected chiefly by the formal, regular evaluation of 
academic research, which in the UK has taken place over some 30 years under the aegis of 
several Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) and most recently operated under what was 
called the ‘Research Excellence Framework’ (REF).29  Some account of its main features, 
bringing out their friendliness to the humanities, will be helpful for readers outside the UK; it 
appears to be necessary for many UK readers too, a point that I shall return to below.  
First, at the very least the existence of the REF and its predecessors registers the importance 
of research for the whole university sector in the UK, including its Humanities departments, 
since virtually every university enters most of its academic departments for evaluation. It thus 
stands in the way of a formal division, which some politicians – and, naturally, some 
academics
30
 – favour, between those universities that do research and those that don’t, 
although the channelling of research funding to the REF ‘winners’ is beginning to result in a 
de facto degree of stratification.  Accordingly, at least in theory, the humanities are seen as 
having a research base no less than the sciences and social sciences. Without this their 
continuing existence in the university would be seriously at risk, not least because all 
teaching is now supposed to be ‘research-led’.31 
Secondly, 65 per cent of REF rankings was determined on the basis of publications. 
(Unfortunately these are designated as ‘outputs’, in the ‘barbaric’ and ‘corrupting’ language 
of ‘control, closure and somewhat crudely crafted measurement’.32) In Education those 
                                                          
28
 Much of what I say here applies across a wide range of academic research and not just to 
educational research. There is no space here to explore this point in detail.  
 
29
 The results of the REF were published in December 2015. The next iteration of the exercise is due 
to finish in 2020. Similar exercises are now to be found in many other countries.   
 
30
 See eg “Top universities should get funding to stop ‘mediocrity’, says Russell Group head”, The 
Daily Telegraph 23 Oct. 2009.  
 
31
 This is widely agreed, partly because it makes it more difficult for government to divide universities 
into those that teach and those that research, though there is less agreement on quite what the phrase 
means.  
 
32
 Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury, quoted in Times Higher Education, 29 Jan. 
2015. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/rowan-williams-on-higher-educations-inhuman-
and-divisive-jargon/2018188.article. 
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publications could include work from any of the disciplines and they could appear as books, 
chapters in books or online-only material as well as conventional academic journal articles.  
Their subject-matter was restricted only by having to be about education in some way. A 
journal article could be about happiness and well-being. A book could be about beauty; it 
might be a biography of a nineteenth-century social and educational reformer. There was 
nothing to prevent an open-access, online-only journal article on the educational implications 
of the thinking of Hannah Arendt or Slavoj Žižek from being highly rated. As a member of 
the Research sub-Panel for Education I estimate such publications amounted to around 40% 
of what was submitted. Naturally there were also empirical studies using large data-sets, 
reports of randomised controlled trials, and all kinds of work that had a statistical, social 
science or experimental basis.  
Thirdly, evaluation of publications was carried out by a panel of academic peers exercising 
their judgement: judgement on the quality of the work submitted. There were no proxies for 
judgement, such as citation counting or the rankings of journals, at any rate for work in 
Education.
33
 Evaluators employed three criteria: originality, rigour and significance. ‘Rigour’ 
was glossed as ‘fitness for purpose’, it included ‘the integrity, coherence and consistency of 
arguments and analysis’,34 and any expectation that it indicated an expectation of ‘scientific’ 
methodologies was explicitly repudiated. ‘Significance’ was understood ‘in terms of the 
intellectual agenda of the field’: thus a journal article that addressed a debate now regarded as 
of little interest, and that did not make a case for its continuing relevance, would have been 
evaluated as of weak significance.  
The point I am concerned to emphasise here is that there was nothing in the way Education 
research was evaluated that would be surprising or unfamiliar to academics specialising in 
History, Philosophy, Theology, Modern Languages or English Literature. There was 
reassurance too for researchers with a humanistic approach to education in the report on the 
Research Excellence Framework published once the outcomes were known.
35
 On work 
submitted in Philosophy of Education, ‘the quality of philosophical outputs was generally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
33
 Economics and Econometrics for example received citation data ‘where available’ and made use of 
it ‘where considered appropriate’. HEFCE, Panel criteria and working methods, January 2012 
(Bristol: HEFCE). 
 
34
 HEFCE, Panel criteria and working methods, 67. 
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very high. World-leading conceptual work addressed and illuminated complex educational 
issues and contributed to the refinement of theoretical understanding’.36  There was  
‘some excellent research in the history of education’.37 ‘Theoretical work in sociology and 
social theory was judged to be very strong, and often innovative’.38 
 
This, if sufficiently widely understood, is a powerful source of support for educational 
research that is rooted in the humanities. However there is at least one aspect of the REF that 
points in a different direction. The 2014 REF gave for the first time a 25% weighting to 
‘Impact’:  every academic subject department was required to include in its submission some 
case-studies (roughly one for every 10 active researchers) demonstrating how its research 
benefits the wider, and specifically non-academic, community. There are, first, obvious 
difficulties in proving such benefits, especially for a humanities department, of Philosophy or 
English Literature, say, though Pure Mathematics will have the same problem, in attempting 
to show the ‘impact’ of its work, and of course its economic impact in particular, beyond the 
world of education. The implicit model seems to be that of working with an industrial partner 
to invent a light-sabre, or to discover and exploit a new lubricant for artificial hip joints.  
A second problem is that the idea of impact, despite its relatively minor standing in the REF – 
25% as opposed to 65% for publications (or ‘outputs’) – has rapidly colonised the academic 
imagination. Perhaps academics always secretly longed to be big players in ‘the real world’; 
perhaps economic impact that can be set out on a spread-sheet is the only thing likely to  
impress the new kinds of managers and administrators that Marina Warner encountered, and 
researchers in search of promotion and favour know who it will pay them to side with. At any 
rate academics from many disciplines, but from Education especially, are now confusing – 
whether through deliberate misconstrual, fantasy or honest misunderstanding – the highly 
specific, and limited, Impact dimension of the REF with the very different criteria for 
publications. (To repeat: these were originality, rigour and significance: ‘significance’ did not 
mean ‘impact’ in the sense that the REF used the term.) It has quickly become common to 
hear people asserting that ‘it’s all about impact now’, or priding themselves on the usefulness 
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of their research by contrast with people who write journal articles or books – which, as we 
have seen, are merely ‘outputs’ in any case.  
A third problem is that academics are naturally being encouraged to prioritise research that 
will have impact,
39
 as opposed to what is sometimes called ‘blue skies’ or ‘curiosity-driven’ 
research whose only criterion is academic merit. Furthermore, they should prioritise their 
impact from the outset rather than trying to create it after the work’s completion: a 
remarkable idea which seems to rule out the possibility of open-mindedness on the part of the 
researcher from the start.
40
 This resembles what is sometimes called ‘sponsorism’: grants 
from outside the university become the only way to buy time to do research. Academics thus 
increasingly design their research programmes in the light of what they have reason to think 
outside bodies – charities, research councils, industry – will fund, rather than, as they once 
did, identifying an interesting field of enquiry and then looking for sources of funding where 
appropriate. 
In this way the REF is widely if wrongly interpreted as in alliance with the other factors 
driving educational research towards the empiricism and scientism – that is, excessive respect 
for the image and tropes of science – that render more humane approaches and paradigms 
ever more marginal. Funding agencies external to the university typically support research 
that involves extensive collection and analysis of data, rather than research that involves 
thinking and writing (however is a specific sum of money to be allocated to anything so 
vague?), with the result that empirical and data-driven projects become prioritised over ones 
based in the humanities. The pressure to take on high fee-paying overseas students has 
similar effects.
41
 Since their grasp of English would need to be exceptionally strong if they 
are to grapple with conceptual distinctions and subtleties or philosophical ideas, it generally 
seems safer to steer them towards approaches that foreground the accumulation and analysis 
of data: to T-test, ANOVA, ANCOVA, Chi-square, Linear regression, Factor analysis, Rasch 
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models and so on, which can be handled in the universal language of mathematics and 
statistics. Then there need to be courses and modules teaching these techniques, with the 
result that they become institutionalised as the standard ways of doing educational research.
42
  
 
V  The interpretive turn 
It will be clear from the previous section that the direction in which educational research, as 
much other academic research, is travelling in the UK is similar to the path that is taking the 
humanities to being understood in largely instrumental ways. In both areas we find the 
reduction of the idea of worthwhileness to what can be expressed in monetary terms, we find 
judgement in danger of being replaced by metrics, and we find researchers, writers and other 
artists being expected to talk up the value of their work to the taxpayer, and to become its 
energetic and unhesitating salespersons, to the point where this becomes the principal 
consideration. Both the humanities and academic research thus become characterised by a 
kind of knowing in advance, a self-assured preparedness to advertise the results and value of 
the work still to be created or the research yet to be done: just as de Botton had no hesitation 
in telling the museum visitor what the meaning of a painting was before she had had time to  
engage with it, academics are expected to plan the impact of their research before they have 
embarked on it. This knowingness, as I have elsewhere described it,
43
 is antithetical to the 
humanities: to the distinctive ways in which they are both brought into being and understood.  
The issue of how artists bring their works into being is beyond the scope of this paper. I shall 
accordingly focus on the second issue. What is central to our understanding of the humanities 
is interpretation. It is usual in this context to distinguish between Erklären and Verstehen, 
between explanation or scientific knowledge on the one hand and ordinary, everyday,  
interpretive understanding on the other.
44
 In the case of Erklären we try to shed light (this is 
the etymology of the German word) on what is obscure. Typically we look for the cause of a 
phenomenon. We want to know if the car will not start because it’s out of fuel, the battery is 
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low or some wiring connections have come loose, or for some other reason. The doctor tries 
to discover whether the patient’s stomach pains are caused by ulcers, gall stones, gluten 
intolerance or any one of a number of other factors. When the car mechanic or the doctor has 
found the explanation they can proceed appropriately to put things right, and that (with luck) 
will be the end of the matter. What we might think of as the brisk, no-nonsense search for 
explanations has been characteristic of the western mind-set for many centuries, its power 
and prestige steadily growing since what we call the Era of Scientific Revolutions that began 
roughly around the start of the seventeenth century, and it is responsible for much that makes 
our lives safer and more comfortable than those of our ancestors.  
Some caution is necessary here: clearly specialists in the humanities are often interested in 
causal explanations, as when historians discuss the origins of the First World War, even if 
this involves a more complex notion of causation than a car failing to start. Musicians 
investigate the sources of jazz. Shakespeare’s influence on Keats, and Keats’s on Wilfred 
Owen, seem to involve a kind of causation. Sociologists are interested in inequality as a cause 
of alienation and civil unrest. Nor is there always a sharp distinction between causes and 
reasons. Reasons can sometimes be causes, as Davidson has argued: this a point of major 
interest in the theory of psychoanalysis, which there is no space to discuss here.
45
  At the 
same time science, which we might be tempted to think of as committed exclusively to 
Erklärung, is often strongly interpretive as well as holding important implications for how we 
are to think of being human. Charles Darwin provides an example of both: much of his work 
consisted of reinterpretation of facts about the natural world that were already known, and it 
has indeed held rich implications for ‘man and his history’, in Darwin’s words, as I noted 
above.  
The central features of interpretation can be seen if we consider the careful interpretation of a 
text: the attempt to make sense of, and reach a thoughtful and measured evaluation of, a 
particular novel, play or poem, a work of philosophy or theology– in short a humanities text, 
understanding ‘text’ in a broad sense to include music, dance and art objects such as 
sculpture; a broad sense justified by the way what is at issue is how we ‘read’ what is before 
us, just as we can talk of ‘reading’ other people. While there is no sense that we expect to 
reach a conclusive ‘reading’ or understanding of a poem by Seamus Heaney or a painting by 
Frida Kahlo, after which we can move on to Wendy Cope and Chris Ofili, there are 
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nevertheless features that are characteristic of good interpretation, and features  that are 
characteristic of bad. We expect readers (or ‘readers’) to attend to the full text and not just 
those features of it that support their preferred interpretation, and to seek out and take account 
of other interpretations that have been offered in the past and are being made in the present. 
An interpretation that is quick, superficial and impressionistic tends to be less impressive than 
one that is rich, subtle and reflective, and to explicate the meaning of such terms does not 
imply subjectivism but emphasises the aspects of interpretation which are common to most 
experienced readers. We do not value a particular interpretation because it supplies the last 
word: it may by contrast give rise to new debate and new ideas about the text, stimulating 
further readings and further thought. The good interpretation is one that we can engage with, 
argue with and develop in turn. Adam Phillips writes of psychoanalysis, that most 
interpretive of human relationships, that it is a matter of ‘translating’ a person ‘while 
suspending our belief in an original’.46 That is to say that there is no more one ‘real’ person to 
be recovered and known than there is a single, univocal meaning of a poem to be established. 
The point of psychoanalysis is ‘to free people to translate and be translated, rather than to 
acquire a definitive, convincing version of themselves’.47 Scientific interpretation, by 
contrast, is generally part of the process of reaching an answer on which the whole scientific 
community will agree, even if that answer is modestly expressed as ‘the best one we have so 
far’.  
If the humanities teach us much about other people and about ourselves, this is no doubt 
partly because their subject matter is the common experience of being human. But it is not 
just what we come to understand through them that is important, but how we come to 
understand it. It is Verstehen that we draw on in our engagement with the humanities, and 
also in our ordinary encounters with other people.
48
 Understanding another person’s 
behaviour (or, indeed, one’s own) is not like shedding light on something which, while 
obscure and elusive, is indubitably there to be discovered, identified and explained. In any 
relationship we may wonder from time to time if we have given offence, if the other person is 
over-reacting to something trivial, if they have displaced some other anxiety or source of 
stress onto something we have said or done. We offer our interpretation, if we are wise, 
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tentatively and with caution – ‘It seems to me that something is worrying you this evening’ – 
in awareness of the possibility that this overture may be hurled back at us – ‘Oh, you’ve 
finally noticed, have you?’ – and in awareness too that the response may be justified. We 
suggest that things at work may be getting our friend or partner down: their agreement, if 
they agree, may seem to end the need for further interpretation and direct the conversation to 
questions of long hours, unsympathetic managers and failed bids for promotion. On the other 
hand our partner’s agreement may strike us as too ready: perhaps there is some other reason, 
something that he or she does not want to talk about. Then there is the delicate matter of 
trying to discover whether they would welcome the offer of support in approaching a subject 
that they are finding difficult to talk about, or experience it as a crass intrusion.   
If I am engaging with somebody in this way their problems do not leave me untouched, not 
least because it may well be less the presenting problem itself that is causing difficulties than 
my own failure to respond to it sensitively. Perhaps I see it too much through the lens of my 
own preoccupations. Thus I need to be attentive to myself as well as to the other person, 
while not allowing myself to become the focus of my interest. Interpretation is never 
finalised: even if the two parties concerned are satisfied by the end of the evening or the week 
that they have made sense of things it is entirely possible that the whole matter will look 
different and need to be opened up again later. Perhaps the other person begins to feel that I 
have manipulated them into a particular way of viewing things; perhaps I begin to resent the 
extent to which his or her concerns have pushed my own ones aside. So it goes on, and the 
fact that interpretation here never reaches a definite conclusion, a final truth so to speak, is 
not a weakness by contrast with the greater propensity of scientific explanation to settle a 
problem and move on. Interpretation can make progress, as my example above shows, even if 
sometimes it doubles back on itself and asks if progress has really been made.  
In this way the humanities, as both sites and reminders of our capacity for interpretation, 
stand for the possibility of endless reinvention, the chance to see ourselves as the 
mischievous children of comic strips, independent adventurers, romantic heroines, battlers 
against oppression of various kinds, lost souls in search of identity, people up against the 
final problems of how to live with old age and impending death. Always they call our powers 
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of interpretation into play to remind us that there is seldom just one real world out there, but a 
variety of perspectives on whatever confronts us. Fay Weldon makes the point memorably:
49
 
It's always wonderful to find out that there is a view of the world, not just the world: a 
pattern to experience, not just experience – and whether you agree with the view 
offered, or like the pattern, is neither here nor there. Views are possible, patterns 
discernible – it is exciting and enriching to know it. 
Of course not everyone finds it wonderful that there are views of the world, and not just the 
world. Fundamentalists, not excluding the fundamentalists of neoliberalism and scientism, 
insist that theirs is the one true view. Their canonical texts are to be taken literally: 
interpretation is anathema. It is one of the great merits of the humanities that they have the 
power to unsettle this insistence; and it is tempting to wonder if this is one reason why they 
find themselves pushed to the margins of a world increasingly dominated by fundamentalists 
of every kind.   
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